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ABSTRACT 
This r epor t  g ives  an economic a n a l y s i s  of usury c e i l i n g s ,  laws which s e t  
t h e  maximum l e g a l  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  t o  be charged on p a r t i c u l a r  types of loans .  
It provides a b r i e f  overview of r ecen t  Federal  l e g i s l a t i o n  dea l ing  wi th  usury,  
with s p e c i a l  emphasis on t h e  Federal  a u t h o r i t i e s  mandated by P.L. 96-221, 
and t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of Federal  preemption of S t a t e  usury laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A usury c e i l i n g  i s  t h e  maximum i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t h a t  may be charged on a 
p a r t i c u l a r  type of loan.  Most o f t en ,  these  c e i l i n g s  a r e  appl ied  t o  c r e d i t  
instruments i n  such "basic" markets a s  t h e  mortgage and consumer loan  markets. 
The charging of i n t e r e s t  was not  a common p r a c t i c e  u n t i l  t h e  Renaissance 
and t h e  economic expans ion t h a t  occurred during t h i s  period.  Nevertheless,  
t h e r e  were l e g a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  payment of i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  Western world, 
some of which were re laxed by t h e  1 9 t h  century. Pub l i c  opinion continued t o  
favor  some form of r e s t r i c t i o n  on excessive r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t ,  and t h e s e  l a w s ,  
al though heavi ly  m d i f  i ed ,  remain i n  ef f e c t  today. 
Usury c e i l i n g s  have been a c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e  f o r  many cen tu r i es .  I n  t h i s  
country,  one of t h e  e a r l i e s t  important p ieces  of Federal  l e g i s l a t i o n  dea l ing  
with usury was t h e  Nat ional  Bank Act of 1863 (12 S ta t .  665). Sect ion 46 of 
t h i s  Act l imi ted  federa l ly-char tered banks t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  allowed by 
t h e  l a w s  of t h e  S t a t e s  o r  T e r r i t o r i e s  i n  which they were located.  Sect ion 30 
of t h e  National  Bank Act of 1864 (13 S t a t .  99) provided t h a t  i f  t h e r e  was 
no such l a w ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  could not exceed 7 percent.  
Of more importance was t h e  1933 amendment t o  t h e  Act (12 U .S.C. s e c .  85) ,  
which, a s  amended, permits Nat ional  banks t o  exceed S t a t e  usury c e i l i n g s .  It 
a l lows National  banks t o  charge a r a t e  of 1 percent i n  excess of t h e  d iscount  
r a t e  on 90-day commercial paper i n  e f f e c t  a t  t h e  Federal  Reserve Bank i n  t h e  
F e d e r a l  Reserve d i s t r i c t  where t h e  bank i s  loca t ed ,  o r  a  r a t e  al lowed by t h e  
S t a t e ,  T e r r i t o r y ,  o r  D i s t r i c t  where t h e  bank is  l o c a t e d ,  whichever is g r e a t e r .  
Another example of Fede ra l  o v e r r i d e  of S t a t e  usury c e i l i n g s  was con ta ined  
i n  P u b l i c  Law 93-501 (October 29, 1974), under which Na t iona l  banks, S t a t e -  
c h a r t e r e d ,  f ede ra l ly - in su red  banks and t h r i f t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( sav ings  and l o a n s  
and mutual  s av ings  banks) ,  and small bus ines s  investment  companies were per- 
mi t t ed  t o  charge i n t e r e s t  of up t o  5  pe rcen t  over  t h e  d iscount  r a t e  a t  t h e  
Fede ra l  Reserve Bank i n  t h e  Fede ra l  Reserve d i s t r i c t  where t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  
was loca t ed  on bus iness  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  l o a n s  of $25,000 o r  more. T h i s  Act 
exp i r ed  on J u l y  1, 1977, but ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  of P u b l i c  Laws 96-221 and 96-399, 
i ts  subs tance  is p r e s e n t l y  i n  e f f e c t  a s  t o  bus iness  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  l o a n s  
of $1,000 o r  more. 
Recent ly ,  t h e  i s s u e  of usury c e i l i n g s  has  aga in  su r f  aced,  mainly because 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a s  determined i n  t h e  market,  have g e n e r a l l y  surpassed  t h e  
maximum l e g a l  r a t e s  a s  s p e c i f i e d  under usury  laws. I n  1980, l e g i s l a t i o n  was 
passed provid ing  f o r  temporary and permanent o v e r r i d e s  on many types  of S t a t e  
usury  c e i l i n g s  i n  an  e f f o r t  t o  remedy t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  Th i s  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  P.L. 
96-221, w i l l  be d i scussed  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  r epor t .  
Along w i t h  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  of  P.L. 96-221, t h i s  r e p o r t  w i l l  g ive  a  pro  
and con a n a l y s i s  of usury c e i l i n g s ,  and a  b r i e f  overview of o t h e r  r e c e n t  l e g i s -  
l a t i o n  d e a l i n g  wi th  t h i s  i s s u e .  
11 This  l a t t e r  o p t i o n  a l lows  Na t iona l  banks t o  charge t h e  r a t e  al lowed 
f o r  s t a t e  banks, o r  t h e  h i g h e s t  r a t e  permi t ted  f o r  any l ende r  f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u -  
l a r  type  of l o a n  involved.  A s  w i l l  be noted,  P u b l i c  Law 96-221 i n  ef f e c t  
g i v e s  S ta t e -cha r t e red ,  f ede ra l ly - in su red  banks and o t h e r  depos i to ry  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h e  same op t ions  pe rmi t t ed  Na t iona l  banks under 12  U.S.C. sec .  85. 
11. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING USURY CEILINGS 
The major argument i n  support  of usury c e i l i n g s  is  t h a t  borrowers a r e  
a b l e  t o  ob ta in  needed funds a t  f a i r  r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t .  Without usury  
c e i l i n g s ,  proponents contend t h a t  many people, (mostly low income), would 
be pr iced out of the  c r e d i t  market because of t h e  high r a t e  of i n t e r e s t .  
That is ,  l e f t  unregulated,  l enders  w i l l  charge extremely high r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t .  
Another argument used i n  support  of usury c e i l i n g s  concerns t h e  a b i l i t y  
of borrowers t o  conduct themselves e f f i c i e n t l y  i n  t h e  c r e d i t  market. Suppor- 
t e r s  claim t h a t  most borrowers a r e  naive ,  and have very l i t t l e  knowledge of 
how t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and c r e d i t  markets a c t u a l l y  operate.  For example, according 
t o  proponents, knowledge of i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and t h e i r  t r e n d s  is g e n e r a l l y  
minimal among non- ins t i tu t iona l  borrowers, and, a s  a r e s u l t ,  lending i n s t i t u -  
t i o n s  might be prone t o  charge high r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t .  
A r e l a t e d  argument dea l s  wi th  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l ender  and borrower. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  proponents, and much of t h e  genera l  pub l i c ,  view borrowers a s  
being a t  a  severe  disadvantage i n  t h e  face  of l a r g e ,  well-financed lending 
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I n  p a r t ,  t h i s  b e l i e f  is  a r e s u l t  of t h e  pub l i c ' s  conception of 
l enders  a s  having a high degree of market power. Since t h i s  view is  widely 
he ld ,  l e g i s l a t o r s  have o f t e n  moved very slowly i n  r a i s i n g  o r  e l imina t ing  
usury c e i l i n g s .  
A four th  content ion of proponents of usury c e i l i n g s  concerns t h e  nega t ive  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and investment. Many people argue t h a t  
lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  tend t o  promote a higher r a t e  of investment. Hence, sup- 
p o r t e r s  c la im t h a t  low usury c e i l i n g s ,  by requ i r ing  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  promote 
investment, leading t o  a h igher  r a t e  of economic growth. 
F i n a l l y ,  a  f i f t h  c o n t e n t i o n  of s u p p o r t e r s  of usury  c e i l i n g s  is  t h a t  t h e  
i s s u e  of u su ry  c e i l i n g s  should be l e f t  up t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  S t a t e s .  Many 
s u p p o r t e r s  f e e l  t h a t  i t  is  unwise t o  a l l ow  F e d e r a l  o v e r r i d e s  of S t a t e  usury  
laws and c e i l i n g s ,  such a s  t hose  mandated i n  P.L. 96-221. 
111. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING USURY CEILINGS 
The = i n  theme underlying arguments of opponents of usury c e i l i n g s  is  
t h a t  usury laws d i s t o r t  the  c r e d i t  market and i t s  operat ion.  
F i r s t ,  opponents contend t h a t  usury c e i l i n g s  do not enable  some who 
could not  otherwise borrow t o  do s o  ( a s  proponents claim).  A s  a  r e s u l t  of 
t h e  l e n d e r ' s  tendency t o  balance off  r i s k  and r e t u r n ,  opponents argue t h a t  
usury c e i l i n g s  cause high r i s k ,  low income customers t o  be pushed out  of t h e  
c r e d i t  market without ob ta in ing  t h e  needed funds. Eventually,  some point  i n  
t h e  c r e d i t  g ran t ing  process w i l l  be reached where t h e  lower r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t ,  
a s  c a l l e d  f o r  under usury laws, w i l l  not  compensate l enders  f o r  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  
they would undertake i n  extending loans  t o  c e r t a i n  p a r t i e s ,  most of whom 
would be low income, high r i s k  borrowers. Taking t h e  p lace  of t h i s  group of 
people, and pushing them out  of t h e  c r e d i t  market, w i l l  be low r i s k ,  high 
income borrowers, whose low r i s k  would compensate l enders  a t  lower r a t e s  
of i n t e r e s t .  
For example, i n  the  S t a t e  of Washington, consumer loans  from c r e d i t  
card companies were a t  an annual r a t e  of 18 percent.  However, t h e  maximum 
r a t e  allowed under usury c e i l i n g s  was lowered t o  12 percent  i n  1968. This 
a c t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  an excess demand f o r  c r e d i t  a t  a n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of 12 
percent.  Supporting t h e  argument of usury c e i l i n g  opponents is  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
low r i s k ,  high income borrowers pushed t h e  high r i s k ,  low income p o t e n t i a l  
borrowers out  of t h e  market. 21 - 
Hence, i n  response t o  t h e  argument t h a t  usury c e i l i n g s  al low people, 
e s p e c i a l l y  those  with high c r e d i t  r i s k  and low income, t o  o b t a i n  c r e d i t  a t  
21 Bowsher, Usury Laws, pp. 123-124. - 
lower r a t e s ,  usury c e i l i n g  opponents contend t h a t  they a r e  not  even given a 
chance a t  ob ta in ing  c r e d i t ,  but a r e  replaced i n  t h e  market by lower r i s k  
borrowers. Furthermore, opponents contend t h a t  the  supply of loanable  funds 
a v a i l a b l e  i n  markets r egu la ted  by usury c e i l i n g s  decl ines .  A s  was previously 
mentioned, usury c e i l i n g s  a r e  genera l ly  imposed on such "basic" markets a s  
mortgage and consumer loan markets. Loanable funds may be taken from these  
regula ted  markets and put i n t o  unregulated markets which o f f e r  a h igher  r a t e  
of r e tu rn .  Often, these  unregulated markets c a t e r  t o  t h e  low r i s k ,  high 
income group of borrowers. Therefore,  p o t e n t i a l  funds a v a i l a b l e  t o  borrowers 
i n  t h e  regu la ted  markets, which many have a high number of high r i s k ,  low 
inconre borrowers, tend t o  con t rac t .  
Another argument used by opponents of usury c e i l i n g s  i s  t h a t  because t h e  
market is d i s t o r t e d ,  optimum d i s t r i b u t i o n  of goods and s e r v i c e s ,  i n  t h i s  case,  
f i n a n c i a l  and c r e d i t  instruments and se rv ices ,  does not come about. The conten- 
t i o n  of t h e  opponents under t h i s  argument i s  t h a t  i f  allowed t o  opera te  f r e e l y ,  
the  opera t ions  of t h e  c r e d i t  market w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  optimum a l l o c a t i o n  of 
resources  and maximum s o c i a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  Opponents contend t h a t  usury 
c e i l i n g s  r e s u l t  i n  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e  market, and a l e s s  than optimal a l l o -  
c a t i o n  of resources  w i l l  r e s u l t  a s  a consequence of these  market i n e f f i c i e n c i e s .  
A t h i r d  argument supporting t h e  opponents' content ion concerning market 
d i s t o r t i o n  dea l s  with t h e  tendency of funds t o  leave S t a t e s  where low usury 
c e i l i n g s  a r e  i n  e f f e c t .  Simply put,  i f  lenders i n  a S t a t e  a r e  bound by usury 
c e i l i n g s  while those  i n  o t h e r  S t a t e s  a r e  not ,  t h e  supply of loanable funds 
i n  the  s e c t o r s  covered by these  c e i l i n g s  w i l l  leave t h a t  S t a t e ,  while t h e  
supply w i l l  expand i n  S t a t e s  without usury c e i l i n g s .  Obviously, t h i s  process 
would r e s u l t  i n  severe  State-to-State d i f fe rences  i n  such "basic" f i n a n c i a l  
and c r e d i t  s e c t o r s  a s  housing and consumer loans.  Without usury c e i l i n g s ,  
opponents claim t h a t  t h i s  d i s t o r t i o n  would no t  come about. 
There a r e  severa l  examples o f t e n  c i t e d  by these  opponents t o  Support 
t h e i r  case. One such example deals  with t h e  S t a t e  of New York, and i t s  former 
8 112 percent c e i l i n g  on home mortgages. This c e i l i n g  r e s u l t e d  i n  New Yotic 
mutual savings banks holding about 48 percent of t h e i r  t o t a l  mortgage p o r t f o l i o  
i n  out-of-State mortgages f o r  t h e  per iod between 1966 and 1976. 21 
Missouri had a similar experience i n  1973 and 1974 with i t s  former 8 percent 
c e i l i n g .  During t h e s e  two years ,  mortgage loans  a t  savings and loans  decl ined 
by 37 percent i n  t h e  S ta te .  The corresponding s t a t i s t i c  i n  neighboring S t a t e s  
was only 6 percent. 21 
A t h i r d  example of t e n  c i t e d  is  Texarkana, Arkansas, a c i t y  both i n  Texas, 
with l en ien t  usury laws, and Arkansas, with a comprehensive 1 0  percent usury 
c e i l i n g .  Usury c e i l i n g  opponents no te  t h a t  near ly  a l l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  deal ing i n  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and c r e d i t  s e c t o r  a r e  on t h e  Texas s i d e  of t h e  c i t y ,  al though t h e  
population is  d i s t r i b u t e d  evenly between t h e  two S ta tes .  
A r e l a t e d  argument o f ten  put f o r t h  by t h e  opponents of usury c e i l i n g s  
concerns t h e  depressing e f f e c t  on S t a t e  economies of usury l a w s .  They claim 
3/ Nathan, Economic Analysis of Usury Laws: An Empirical  Survey, p. 164. -
4 /  Ib id . ,  p. 165. - 
t h a t  economic growth is slowed because of usury c e i l i n g s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  lack 
of loanable funds. 
The c l a s s i c  example of such an argument dea l s  wi th  t h e  S t a t e  of Tennessee, 
where a 10  percent c e i l i n g  on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ex i s t ed .  When market r a t e s  were 
below the  maximum l e g a l  r a t e s ,  Tennessee's economy was growing a t  a r a t e  t h a t  
was f a s t e r  than t h e  r a t e  of growth of t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. However, when 
market r a t e s  r o s e  above t h e  10  percent =ximum r a t e ,  growth slowed considerably.  
For t h e  period 1974-1976, l o s s e s  t o  t h e  Tennessee economy have been es t imated 
a s  being $150 m i l l i o n  pe r  yea r  i n  output,  7,000 jobs per year,  $80 m i l l i o n  i n  
r e t a i l  s a l e s ,  and f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  l o s s  t o  f i n a n c i a l  in te rmedia r i e s  was $1.25 
b i l l i o n  per  year. 1/ Opponents claim t h a t  without the  10  percent usury c e i l i n g  
i n  e f f e c t ,  t h i s  slowdown i n  economic growth would not have occurred,  and t h e  
Tennessee economy would have continued t o  grow a t  a r ap id  r a t e  i n  comparison 
wi th  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. 
There is  a counter-argument t o  t h e  claim t h a t  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a s  a 
r e s u l t  of usury c e i l i n g s ,  w i l l  lead t o  a h igher  r a t e  of investment. This  
counterargument  is  t h a t  lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  r e s u l t i n g  from usury c e i l i n g s ,  
w i l l  push t h e  savings  r a t e  down. Because of t h e  low r a t e s  of r e tu rn ,  holders  
of mney m y  not want t o  put  t h e i r  su rp lus  funds i n  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
Ins tead ,  they may wish t o  hold those  funds a s  i d l e  cash balances, o r  i n  
some o t h e r  non-product ive  f o m .  
A f i n a l  content ion of usury c e i l i n g  opponents is  t h a t  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n  
t h e  market, a s  a r e s u l t  of usury c e i l i n g s ,  su r face  i n  the  form of lenders  
51 Ibid . ,  p. 166. - 
f i n d i n g  l o o p h a l e s  and o t h z r  ways t a  avoid asury laws .  Then, l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  
d r a f t e d  t o  " p a t c h u p "  t h e s e  i m p e r f e c t i o n s ,  a f t e r  which, l e n d e r s  l o o k  f o r  fur-  
th2r  o p p a r t u n i t i e s  of avoidance,  w i t h  the  pracess  go ing  on and on. Scarce  
r e s o u r c e s  a r e  put t o  t h e  i n e f f i c i e n t  u s e  o f  c a r r y i n g  on t h i s  p r o c e s s .  
I V .  RECENT MAJOR LEGISLATION 
Several  p ieces  of major l e g i s l a t i o n  dea l ing  wi th  usury c e i l i n g s  were adopted 
i n  t h e  96th Congress. These were P.L. 96-104, P.L. 96-161, and P.L. 96-221. 
The f i r s t ,  P.L. 96-104 (November 5,  l979) ,  provided f o r  a temporary exemp- 
t i o n  from S t a t e  usury laws on c e r t a i n  business and a g r i c u l t u r e  loans  u n t i l  
J u l y  1, 1981. T i t l e  I of t h e  Act permitted any n a t i o n a l  banking a s s o c i a t i o n ,  
federa l ly- insured bank, o r  federa l ly- insured savings  and loan a s s o c i a t i o n  t o  
charge i n t e r e s t  on business  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  loans  of $25,000 o r  more a t  a 
r a t e  of up t o  5 percent i n  excess of t h e  discount r a t e  i n  e f f e c t  a t  t h e  
Federal  Reserve Bank i n  t h e  Federal  Reserve d i s t r i c t  where t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  
was located.  
Furthermore, T i t l e  I of t h e  Act re laxed c e i l i n g s  concerning business  
loans  of smal l  bus iness  investment companies. T i t l e  111 s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  
Act applied i n  S t a t e s  having a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  provis ion which provides t h a t  
a l l  c o n t r a c t s  wi th  an  annual r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  g r e a t e r  than 10 percent  s h a l l  
be void a s  t o  p r i n c i p a l  and i n t e r e s t .  
The second Act, P.L. 96-161 (December 28, 1979), was very similar t o  
P.L. 96-104. One major d i f fe rence  is t h a t  t h i s  law appl ied  i n  a l l  S t a t e s  wi th  
any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  provis ions  l i m i t i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
A t h i r d  p iece  of major l e g i s l a t i o n  deal ing wi th  usury c e i l i n g s  was P.L. 
96-221 (March 31, 1980), t h e  Depository I n s t i t u t i o n s  Deregula t ion and Monetary 
Control  Act of 1980. This Act i s  one of t h e  most important  p ieces  of f inan-  
c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  Federal  Reserve A c t  of 1913. The Act was designed 
t o  improve t h e  Federa l  Reserve's monetary c o n t r o l  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  t o  enable  
deposi tory  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  adapt t o  t h e  inc reas ing ly  competi t ive economic 
environment i n  which they naw operate ,  and f o r  o the r  purposes. 
A major p a r t  of t h e  Act, T i t l e  V ,  dea l s  wi th  usury lending limits. It 
permanently preempts S t a t e  usury c e i l i n g s  on conventional  mortgage loans,  
al though t h i s  provis ion can be overridden by t h e  a f f e c t e d  S t a t e s  i f  they a c t  
wi th in  t h r e e  years .  
Another provis ion i n  T i t l e  V al lows f o r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  of up t o  5 percent 
above t h e  Federa l  Reserve discount r a t e  on business and a g r i c u l t u r a l  loans  of 
over $25,000. This f i g u r e  has s i n c e  been lowered t o  $1,000 (P.L. 96-399). The 
provis ion is  i n  e f f e c t  f o r  t h r e e  years ,  from Apr i l  1, 1980 u n t i l  Apr i l  1, 1983, 
un less  overridden by t h e  a f f e c t e d  S t a t e s .  A s  of J u l y  1981, e i g h t  S t a t e s  (Colo- 
rado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina,  and South 
Dakota) have adopted l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  overr ide  some of t h e  provis ions  s e t  f o r t h  
i n  P.L. 96-221. 
A t h i r d  provis ion of T i t l e  V deal ing w i t h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  al lows federa l ly-  
insured deposi tory  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  change t h e  same i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  permitted 
National  banks by 12 U.S .C. sec. 85 on o t h e r  loans  ( see  in t roduc t ion) .  Again, 
the  a f f e c t e d  S t a t e s  have t h e  r i g h t  t o  overr ide ,  but ,  under t h i s  provis ion,  
they may over r ide  a t  any time. 
Another p rov i s ion  gives  s p e c i a l  r i g h t s  t o  small business investment com- 
panies ,  while a provision of T i t l e  I11 r a i s e s  t h e  permanent lending l i m i t  on 
loans  by Federal  c r e d i t  unions t o  15  percent ,  up from t h e  previous 12 percent ,  
and supp l i es  gu ide l ines  a s  t o  how t h e  r a t e  may be increased t o  l e v e l s  above 
15  percent f o r  per iods  of up t o  18 months. 
P.L. 96-221 supersedes previous l e g i s l a t i o n  covering t h e  same time period,  
P.L. 96-104 and P.L. 96-161, providing f o r  more l imi ted  over r ides  of S t a t e  usury 
c e i l i n g s .  
J u s t  a s  P.L. 96-221 provided f o r  Federal  over r ide  of S t a t e  usury c e i l i n g s  
covering t h e  conventional mortgage market, d i f f e r e n t  types of mortgage loans  
a r e  exempted from S t a t e  usury c e i l i n g s  by o ther  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
For example, P .L . 96-128 (November 28, 197 9) exempts Veterans ' Administra- 
t i o n  insured mortgage loans from S t a t e  usury ce i l ings .  Another l a w ,  P.L. 96-399 
(October 8, 1980) deals  with a d i f f e r e n t  type of government-insured loan. 
Under t h i s  Act, t h e  mortgage insur ing  a u t h o r i t y  of t h e  Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (through t h e  Federal  Housing Administrat ion o r  "FHA") i s  
extended through September 30, 1981, along wi th  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  s e t  c e i l i n g  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  mortgages. 
F ina l ly ,  severa l  p ieces  of l e g i s l a t i o n  have been introduced i n  t h e  97th 
Congress regarding usury c e i l i n g s .  Several ,  such a s  S. 963, S. 14Q6, and H.R. 
2501, dea l  wi th  t h e  i s sue  of preempting S t a t e  usury ce i l ings .  
V . CONCLUSION 
The content ions  of those  favor ing t h e  use  of usury c e i l i n g s  d e a l  p r imar i ly  
with equi ty ,  borrower p ro tec t ion ,  and S t a t e s '  r i g h t s .  They may be sumnrarized 
a s  follows: 
1. Borrowers can o b t a i n  t h e  needed funds a t  f a i r  r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t  under 
usury c e i l i n g s .  
2. I n  genera l ,  borrowers know very l i t t l e  about t h e  c r e d i t  market and i t s  
operat ions ,  and need t h e  p ro tec t ion  provided by usury c e i l i n g s .  
3. I n  deal ing w i t h  l a rge ,  well-f inanced lending i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  borrowers 
a r e  a t  a  severe  disadvantage unless  protected by usury c e i l i n g s .  
4 .  Lower i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  under usury c e i l i n g s  promote a  h igher  r a t e  of 
investment. 
5. Usury c e i l i n g s  a r e  a  mat ter  of S t a t e s '  r i g h t s ,  and i t  is unwise t o  
have Federal  over r ides  of S t a t e  usury c e i l i n g s .  
S imi la r ly ,  opponents of usury c e i l i n g s  o f f e r  many arguments suppor t ing t h e i r  
main content ion t h a t  usury laws and c e i l i n g s  d i s t o r t  t h e  c r e d i t  market. They 
may be summarized a s  follows: 
1. Usury c e i l i n g s  cause high r i s k ,  low income borrowers t o  be forced from 
t h e  c r e d i t  market. 
2. Optimum d i s t r i b u t i o n  of f i n a n c i a l  and c r e d i t  goods and s e r v i c e s  does not 
come about under usury c e i l i n g s .  
3. State-to-State d i f fe rences  i n  t h e  supply of loanable funds r e s u l t s .  
4 .  Usury c e i l i n g s  have a  depress ing e f f e c t  on S t a t e  economies. 
5. The lower r a t e s  of i n t e r e s t  under usury c e i l i n g s  r e s u l t  i n  a  lower 
r a t e  of savings.  
6. I n e f f i c i e n c i e s  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  c r e d i t  market a s  a  r e s u l t  of a c t i o n s  
taken t o  avoid usury c e i l i n g s .  
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